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 LAEBA OVERVIEW 
 
 
The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), through the Integration and Regional 
Programs Department, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), through the ADB Institute 
have undertaken a joint initiative to promote and launch a new program, the “Latin 
America/Caribbean and Asia/Pacific Economics and Business Association (LAEBA).” LAEBA 
will be dedicated to strengthening linkages between the Latin America/Caribbean and 
Asia/Pacific regions through a variety of research and exchange activities.  
 
The LAEBA initiative results from an inter-agency Partnership Agreement signed on March 
17th, 2001 between the IADB and ADB at the 42nd Annual Meetings of the Board of 
Governors of the IADB and the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) in Santiago, 
Chile. The Partnership Agreement promotes the exchange of institutional and regional 
development experiences and expertise between the two regions.  
  
 
The mission of LAEBA is to: 
 
• Encourage comparative and applied research in the areas of economics, finance, 
business economics, and public policy of both regions. 
 
• Provide an inter-regional framework for professional networks to collaborate on issues 
of mutual interest between the regions. 
 
• Facilitate and inform the process of economic policy-making and private sector 
decisions through enhanced interaction among policymakers, academia, and the 
business community. 
 





























Over the past two decades, nearly all developing countries and transition 
economies have undertaken important changes in their trade regimes, often as part of 
World Bank-International Monetary Fund programs. Recently, further changes in trade 
regimes have been driven by participation in regional trade agreements and in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization. However, while greater 
openness appears to have produced useful gains, not all countries have benefited equally 
from the reforms. This study attempts to distinguish between important elements of the 
reform programs, taking account of the linkages with other economic policies, and to derive 
some indicators of trade policy performance that might be used in developing more precise 
guidelines for future reforms. 
 
The paper looks at the relative importance of reforms in different regions and 
corresponding trade performance. It starts by describing the overall economic performance 
of a number of countries in Latin America, Europe, and Asia. Then, it reviews Latin 
American trade policies over the past 20 years, and provides an international comparison, 
developing indicators that could serve as guidelines for monitoring progress. It concludes 
with a discussion of the links between trade and other economic policies.  
 
 III
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Over the past two decades, nearly all developing countries and transition economies 
have undertaken important changes in their trade regimes, often as part of World Bank-
International Monetary Fund programs.  Recently, further changes in trade regimes have been 
driven by participation in regional trade agreements (RTAs) and in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO).  However, while greater openness 
appears to have produced useful gains, not all countries have benefited equally from the 
reforms. This study attempts to distinguish between important elements of the reform programs, 
taking account of the linkages with other economic policies, and to derive some indicators of 
trade policy performance that might be used in developing more precise guidelines for future 
reforms. 
The study looks at the relative importance of reforms in different regions and 
corresponding trade performance. The first section describes the overall economic performance 
of a number of countries in Latin America, Europe, and Asia.  The second section reviews Latin 
American trade policies over the past 20 years, and the third section provides an international 
comparison and develops indicators that could serve as guidelines for monitoring progress.  The 
fourth section discusses the links between trade and other economic policies.   
 
 
Economic Performance in Selected Countries 
 
The overall economic performance of Latin America has been somewhat less 
satisfactory than that of the Pacific Asian region, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, although 
there was a marked improvement in the 1990s until the Brazilian crisis.  Table 9-1 gives the real 
growth in GDP from 1965-70 to 1997-98 for a number of countries in Latin America, Europe, 
and Asia, chosen to represent a range of policy choices and performance.1   Chile has been the 
lead performer in Latin America, but Argentina and the Dominican Republic had increased 
                                                     
1 The effects of the East Asian crisis already show up in the 1997-98 data for Pacific Asia. 
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economic growth in the 1990s.  The Latin American countries also performed well prior to the 
debt crisis of the early 1980s, which had only a minor effect on countries in Pacific Asia. 
Overall growth is reflected in per capita incomes.  While Latin American incomes were 
considerably higher than those of the Pacific Asian countries up to 1985, by the late 1990s, 
income levels in Pacific Asia ($11,449) were 50 percent higher than those in Latin America 
($7,622) (World Bank 2000).  Income growth in the Central European countries has lagged 
behind even Latin America since the late 1990s.  The growth rate in Chile’s income levels has 
been only slightly below the average in Pacific Asia since 1985, and above it in 1995-97. 
Pacific Asia’s export performance was also better than that of Latin America in 1980-95.  
Latin America was able to lift its performance in 1995-97, with strong results in Mexico, 
Argentina, and the Dominican Republic (table 9-2). Latin American and Central European 
countries had comparable performance in 1990-95, while Poland’s strong exports sustained a 
superior European performance over other regions in 1997-98. 
Extensive debate has focused on the link between openness and economic performance 
(Sachs and Warner 1995; Rodrik 1999).  Although analysts generally accept that trade 
liberalization makes a positive contribution to economic growth, at least in the medium-to-long 
term, some criticize the econometric evidence.  Rodrik, in particular, emphasizes the importance 
of governance rather than openness per se.  Even economists who accept the general 
proposition recognize that the short-term effects need not be positive (Mosley 2000). In practice, 
there is likely a considerable overlap, with more open economies also undertaking institutional 
reforms.  The evidence from the countries covered by this study fits the general pattern, with a 
moderate positive correlation between growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) in the 
selected countries in the 1990s against their trade/GDP ratios for the same period (figure 9-1).   
Figure 9-2 plots the aggregate export performance of Latin America and Pacific Asia 
(exports of goods and services in current U.S. dollars, indexed at 1995=100) and their real 
exchange rates in 1980-98.  (The real exchange rate is the U.S. dollar rate adjusted by the 
relative movements in inflation, measured by GDP deflators.)  The figure shows a significant 
negative correlation in the 1990s, implying that a real appreciation is associated with a negative 
movement in exports of goods and services. 
We also regressed the export index in figure 9-2 against real exchange rates and the 
aggregate economic growth of major industrial economies in 1981-98.  Table 9-3 shows that the 
aggregate export performance of the selected countries is positively affected by GDP growth in 
the industrial countries and negatively affected by their real exchange rates.  Since the data are 
in index form (1995=100), the interpretation of the coefficients is that relative to the base year, 
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1995, a 1-point movement in the index of GDP in the industrial countries will call forth an 
increase of 2.27 points in the exports of goods and services in the selected developing 
countries.  By contrast, a 1-point appreciation of the real exchange rate in the selected countries 
will cause a decrease of 0.46 points in their exports. 
The main message from this analysis is that, while developing countries can do little 
about the economic performance of industrial countries, developing countries can operate on 
their own export performance in several ways.  First, they can affect the real exchange rate by 
trying to control or liberalize movements in their nominal exchange rate, directly or indirectly (for 
example, through monetary policies).  Similarly, an autonomous or policy-induced increase in 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows would likely cause an appreciation under a floating 
currency regime, and vice versa. 
Second, developing countries could operate on price movements in their own countries 
by using macroeconomic and microeconomic policies that affect investment, technology, 
industry, and trade.  For example, trade policies impact efficiency in the allocation of resources, 
technology, and productivity.  Adoption of new technologies may be the key to improving 
productivity—and hence unit prices and international competitiveness.  Although transparent 
and predictable trade policies are helpful in attracting FDI, which is often associated with new 
technologies, other governance factors also affect the attractiveness of a host country for FDI.   
 
 
Latin American Trade Policies 
 
From Import Substitution to Outward Orientation 
 
Until the reforms that began in the 1980s, Latin America (like many developing regions) 
was characterized by a high degree of government intervention and state ownership.  In trade 
policy, policymakers thought that import protection and import substitution industrialization (ISI) 
were needed to generate jobs and provide income stability.  They used infant industry 
(economy) arguments to justify shutting out foreign trade by means of exchange controls, 
multiple exchange rates, quantitative import restrictions or prohibitions, high tariffs, subsidies, 
and tax breaks.  Export restrictions or taxes channeled raw materials to domestic processing 
industries (in the transition economies, they have been used in the past to ensure food 
supplies).  There was widespread xenophobia about foreign investment, and many countries 
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placed legal and constitutional obstacles in the way of foreign participation in the development 
of natural resources and financial and other services.   
A particularly important consequence, the ISI policies created an anti-export bias: import 
protection reduces the demand for foreign currencies (apparently saving foreign exchange), but 
this inevitably pushes up the exchange rate, making exports more expensive and reducing their 
international competitiveness.  Specifically, ISI policies had strong negative effects in 
agriculture—an area of comparative advantage in Latin America (Krueger, Schiff, and Valdez 
1988), exacerbating rural poverty and encouraging the drift to urban areas.  In industry, tariffs 
were generally high, unbound, and set in tiers that escalated with the level of processing, 
although they were often irrelevant because of the prevalence of nontariff measures (from 
minimum prices to quantitative restrictions).2   Moreover, there were so many tariff exemptions 
that the published tariff often bore little resemblance to the duties collected.3  The tariffs, import 
restrictions with liberal exemptions, and tax breaks for key sectors created a policy mix that was 
so complex as to be partly self-defeating.  Industry lost touch with international markets, falling 
behind in the adoption of newer technologies and international competitiveness. 
The lack of any discernable growth and high inflation in the 1980s paved the way for a 
break with the past.  Per capita incomes were declining, unemployment soared, and social 
programs were threatened.  In a number of cases, there were serious balance-of-payments 
crises (Indonesia, Mexico, and Nigeria); in Latin America, there was acute hyperinflation 
(Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru).  Following the growing disillusion with the failure of past policies 
(or at least a recognition that the ISI model had run its course), many countries noted the 
achievements of the fast-growing economies in East Asia, which were either open (Singapore 
and Hong Kong) or had begun reforms much earlier (Korea and Chinese Taipei), albeit with 
different emphases in key elements. 
Today, the trade policy situation is much clearer than in the pre-reform period.  
Developing countries have eliminated most nontariff barriers and tariff exemptions, applied 
lower most-favored-nation (MFN) rates, and adopted more uniform tariff structures.  However, 
much remains to be done.   
 
 
                                                     
2 Papageorgiou, Michaely, and Choksi (1990) provide an excellent review. 
3 For example, in Argentina, the average nominal tariff was reduced from 98 to 49 percent in the Martinez 
de Hoz period (1976-81), and stood at more than 30 percent in 1988, but the ratio of duties collected to 
total imports was close to 2 percent for all the years between 1970 and 1988. 
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Trade Liberalization and Domestic Growth: First Evidence 
 
Table 9-4 gives an overview of the changes and their impact on growth.  It presents 
applied (rather than bound) MFN tariff rates before and after the main reforms for a small group 
of countries. All the countries in the sample show a positive relation between reduced protection 
and increased growth rates (table 9-1).  This relation is captured by “tariff liberalization gross 
elasticities,” defined as the increase or decrease in the growth rates (before and after tariff 
liberalization) with respect to the decrease in tariff protection. 4 The gross qualification is 
intended to convey that tariff changes are likely to be accompanied by regulatory reforms in 
other domains (for instance, reduction of nontariff measures, liberalization of financial 
transactions, better macroeconomic policies, and general governance), which are generally 
(although not necessarily) consistent with tariff reductions.   
Gross tariff elasticities can be estimated for the short and long run.  Short-run estimates 
are based on changes in the growth performance between the five-year periods immediately 
preceding and following the liberalization; long-run estimates are based on the average growth 
rates for the entire periods available before and after liberalization.  It seems reasonable to give 
precedence to gross elasticities in the short run because trade is only one growth factor among 
several.  The impact of any tariff liberalization is likely to decrease with time, assuming all other 
things constant and the absence of indirect effects of liberalization on technical progress, and 
competitive market structures. 
Table 9-4 provides three major results.  First, all the short-run elasticities except one are 
negative, as expected.  For instance, in Argentina, a 1-percent tariff decrease is associated with 
a 0.36-percent increase in the growth rate.  The exception is Mexico, which exhibits a positive 
(although small) short-run elasticity.  Setting data problems aside, two reasons may explain the 
Mexican anomaly:  macroeconomic problems and the already existing maquiladora regime.  In 
any case, this result is interesting because it fits well with the insistence of the Mexican 
authorities to conclude the NAFTA agreement. 
Second, the highest elasticities are those observed for Chile, which has a uniform MFN 
tariff—another observation tending to support the superiority of the uniform tariff formula over a 
product-discriminatory tariff liberalization (Tarr 2001).  This result likely mirrors the existence of 
                                                     
4 It is crucial to relate changes in growth rates to changes in the level of protection. Relating growth rates 
to the level of protection (as Bairoch [1993] did in examining the European liberalization of the 1860s) is 
not the relation suggested by economic analysis, and indeed it leads to a result—the European tariff 
liberalization of the 1860s-1970s leading to recession—that is not observed if changes are taken into 
account (Messerlin 1985). 
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other liberalization measures in Chile (a uniform tariff is such a bold approach that it is unlikely 
to be limited to tariff matters). 
Third, long-run elasticities may be positive—once again, not such a surprising result 
because many factors other than trade liberalization play a role in domestic growth.  Long-run 
elasticities are negative in only three cases:  Argentina, Chile, and Poland.  In the Chilean case, 
this result re-emphasizes the robustness and simplicity of the Chilean trade policy in the long 
run (enhancing the expectations of further liberalization in Chile, as recently underlined by the 
reduction in MFN tariffs from 11 to 9 percent with little opposition).  By contrast, the Polish case 
may reveal the expectations related to the Polish accession to the European Union (Poland will 
have to adopt lower European Union tariffs).  Positive long-run elasticities are consistent with 
economic analysis for the remaining eight countries, to the extent that some reversal in tariff 
liberalization is observed in the other countries of the sample, particularly if anti-dumping 
measures are included.  That leaves Argentina as the only country in the sample with a negative 
long-run elasticity despite a (slight) reversal in tariff protection between 1992 and 2000.5 
Gross tariff liberalization elasticities can also be computed with respect to changes in 
export performance.  Table 9-4 presents the results for exports of goods only, and for exports of 
goods and services.  Negative elasticities are the rule, a result consistent with economic 
analysis showing that tariffs on imports are de facto taxes on exports.   
 
 
Multilateral Framework and Domestic Goals 
 
Prior to the Uruguay Round, Latin American interest in GATT was largely aimed at 
improving access to foreign markets, including by securing legitimacy for special and differential 
treatment.  At the beginning of the Uruguay Round, the position of the Latin American countries 
began to evolve.  GATT members, such as Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico, began to play an 
active and positive role in the Uruguay Round negotiations.  Initially, they adopted a strategy of 
asking for credit for their previous unilateral actions on trade liberalization, which they undertook 
in connection with World Bank lending programs.  This was not a successful move, both 
because industrial countries did not believe that there would be a reversal of the ongoing trade 
liberalization, and because Latin American governments were increasingly convinced that trade 
liberalization was good for the implementing country.  In addition, since 1986, some 15 Latin 
                                                     
5 The tariff reversal consisted of the merger of tariffs and the statistical tax (hence, the reversal was more 
apparent than real). 
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American countries have joined the GATT/WTO, binding all their MFN tariffs at ceiling levels 
ranging from 20 to 50 percent and, in some cases, making binding commitments on nontariff 
measures.   
In the Uruguay Round itself, all Latin American GATT members made comprehensive 
ceiling-binding commitments, normally around 35 percent.  The main exceptions to the 35 
percent ceiling binding were Peru, which bound across the board at 30 percent, and Costa Rica, 
which bound at 40 percent.  Overall in the Round, the Latin American countries cut their bound 
rates by 24.5 percent (Guzman and Laird 1998).  However, these concessions were to bind at 
rates substantially above current applied tariff rates, leaving scope for tariff increases. 
Apart from tariff reforms, the Latin American countries also committed themselves to the 
multilateral rules-based system, which the Uruguay Round was extending in such areas as 
services and trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs), as well as to tightened disciplines 
in other areas (see Safadi and Laird 1996).  These disciplines are being reviewed in the WTO 
work program established at the Fourth WTO Ministerial Meeting in November 2000, where 
market access negotiations in industrial products were added to those previously agreed on in 
agriculture and services. 
 
 
Regionalism Old and New 
 
Prior to the reforms of the last 10-15 years, tariff preferences were widespread 
throughout the region.  But they were established bilaterally or among groups of countries under 
the Asociación Latino Americana de Integración (ALADI) umbrella with different product 
coverage, limited degrees of preference, and often production-sharing agreements.  All these 
agreements failed for several key reasons (de Melo and Dhar 1992):  many products were 
excluded from the coverage of the agreements, high rates of protection were maintained against 
third countries, and there was little scope for economies of scale.  Thus, the early regional 
arrangements essentially led to amplified trade diversion, and reduced rather than increased 
welfare (Langhammer and Hiemenz 1991).   
Paralleling the autonomous reform process in Latin America and the increased 
GATT/WTO membership in the 1980s and early 1990s, RTAs have flourished in Latin 
America—mirroring a worldwide movement to which the European Union has by far been the 
largest contributor, the hub for a host of RTAs (Crawford and Laird 2001; Messerlin 2001).  
Among the more important of these new or reformulated RTAs are Mercosur (and its FTAs with 
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Bolivia and Chile), the Andean Community, the Central American Common Market (CACM), the 
G3 (Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela), and the Caribbean Rim Agreement.  Several Latin 
American countries are also participants in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
although this is not as yet a preferential trade agreement, espousing open regionalism.  Last but 
not least, there is the plan for a Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) by 2005 that would 
subsume all existing trade agreements in the region and carry trade liberalization further than 
previously imagined. 
All these new RTAs differ markedly from those of the 1960s.  They not only cover tariff 
liberalization covering almost all products, but they also aim at comprehensive agreements in 
the areas of investment, intellectual property, rules of origin, anti-dumping duties, sanitary 
standards, dispute settlement, and competition policy.  Beyond the questions related to their 
sheer complexity and overlap, these new RTAs raise two key strategic issues for Latin 
American countries. 
First, do RTAs with industrial countries have greater credibility than intradeveloping 
country RTAs?  This question of increased credibility, as well as improved market access and 
even political stability, echoes the problems behind the candidatures of Central European 
countries to the European Union.  Available evidence from these cases does not strongly 
support the credibility argument in favor of RTAs with industrial countries.  For instance, tariff 
increases from European Union partners have preceded the Europe Agreements.  They have 
been unsuccessful in reducing the skyrocketing use of anti-dumping measures, both between 
the members of the agreements and between the members and outsiders.  Their complexities 
(for instance, on rules of origin) have generated transaction costs higher than small tariffs 
(moreover, these costs tend to be appropriated by trade intermediaries, fueling rent-seeking 
tactics).  They have generated increases in applied tariffs by developing countries against their 
neighboring nonmembers (in an attempt to minimize losses of tariff revenues due to decreases 
in their tariffs vis-à-vis industrial hubs).  Lastly, for most of these agreements, there is no 
evidence of large FDI inflows that could be directly attributed to them. However, Hartler and 
Laird (1999) show that Turkey’s MFN tariff was reduced by half and the implementation of a 
number of measures under the Customs Union Agreement has been beneficial to Turkey and 
third countries.  The main exception is agriculture, where both Turkey and the European Union 
have high levels of protection.  Evidently, much depends on the details of the case, and it 
cannot be assumed that engaging in an RTA with industrial countries is necessarily welfare 
increasing. 
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Second, how easy will it be for Latin American countries to multilateralize the existing 
RTAs in which they participate?  For instance, to what extent will the combination of the FTAA 
and an RTA with the European Union be close to worldwide free trade for the Latin American 
countries that would decide to join these two envisaged RTAs?  If they were close to worldwide 
free trade, then Latin American countries might be induced to multilateralize them rapidly in the 
context of WTO Rounds of liberalization—an incentive that could be shared by other developing 




Trade Policy Regimes: An International Comparison 
 
Evolution of Trade Policies 
 
There are some indications that trade policies have moved more slowly in Latin America 
than elsewhere.  For instance, the use of nontariff measures has declined in many countries 
(Michalopoulos 1999; Laird 1999).  However, nonautomatic licensing is still relatively frequent in 
Latin America (often related to the administration of tariff quotas in the agricultural sector); 
variable levies, associated with the use of price band systems, are important in Chile and 
Colombia; and prohibitions are still current in Brazil.  Counterbalancing this decline in nontariff 
measures, there has been an increase in the use of administrative measures, such as anti-
dumping, where certain Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) are among the 
most intensive users.  Lastly, export regimes have survived in many Latin American countries, 
in sharp contrast with the Pacific Asian countries, which have mostly dismantled their export 
regimes since 1995, with the nearly complete elimination of the export processing zone 
instrument. 
To gain an understanding of these moves in relative terms, we attempt to construct 
indices to allow broad comparisons between the trade policies of various countries.  This 
approach highlights the determinants that producers and traders take into consideration when 
deciding to export to (or invest in) foreign markets. Firms export more to or from markets 
subjected to the best trade policies (even if they still do not fit the free trade ideal) than to other 
markets, and trade policies compete with each other to attract trade (and investment) flows. The 
approach has two additional advantages: it provides useful lessons to countries for improving 
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their existing trade policy, and it does not require knowledge of the absolute costs related to 
trade policies (which is hard to find), but a mere ranking of the trade policies examined. 
When looking at foreign markets, firms consider a wider range of features than free 
trade.  First, they consider whether the examined trade policy is simple to understand and 
predict.  Second, they determine whether it will guarantee secure access in the future.  And they 
analyze the policy’s openness in terms of market access (the free trade component). In order to 
address these concerns, we considered three indices—simplicity, irreversibility, and 
openness—for a reference set of 39 countries (including 10 in Latin America), based on data 





Building the Indices 
Simplicity indices aim at capturing the information and other transaction costs that a trade policy 
imposes.  They are intended to determine the extent of effort that producers, traders, and 
investors need in order to understand the trade policy of a country. The simplicity index in 
agriculture relies on six basic indicators.   
 
1. Does the tariff schedule of the country examined include many tariff lines, meaning 
that more effort most be devoted to find the correct tariff line to be used, or that there are 
more risks of errors by or conflicts with the country’s customs authorities than would be 
the case with a tariff schedule consisting of a more limited number of tariff lines?   
2. What is the percentage of non-ad valorem bound tariffs? A low percentage would 
imply that greater effort is required to assess the real level of protection because specific 
tariffs or combined specific ad valorem tariffs entail a level of protection that varies with 
world prices.   
3. What is the standard deviation of bound tariffs? A high deviation requires more effort 
to find out the exact tariff rate.  Risks in the face of different rates are high, and the 
consequences potentially more costly than for a low standard deviation.  A zero standard 
deviation signals a uniform tariff policy that has two advantages. First, it minimizes the 
information and transaction costs of foreign exporters for determining the nominal tariff 
rate (unique by definition). Second, it does not disturb the country’s comparative 
advantage (the effective rate of protection of each industry is equal to the unique 
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nominal tariff rate), so that foreign investors have no reason to make complex 
calculations in order to know the effective tariff rates that their production will face, if 
located in the country.   
4. What is the percentage of non-duty-free tariffs? A high percentage would imply 
greater risks of facing different tariffs (hence, information costs).  
5. How many product groups are affected by the export subsidy reduction commitments 
signed by the country in question under the Uruguay Agriculture Agreement (UAA)? A 
small number would suggest a less complicated assessment of the support granted to 
the domestic producers of the examined country.   
6. How many tariff quotas are included in the country’s UAA commitments? A high 
number would imply the need for greater efforts to investigate the impact of these tariff 
quotas. 
 
This list does not exhaust all possible indicators of simplicity.  Indicator 1 would be improved 
with information on the existence and magnitude of changes in the number of lines during 
recent years (in order to capture the possible reshuffling of the tariff schedule for protectionist 
purposes) and on the number of tariff schedules that reflect preferential agreements involving 
the country examined.  Indicator 2 would be more complete with evidence on seasonal tariffs 
and/or the number of public authorities (ministries and agencies) in charge of trade issues.  
Indicator 4 would be improved by information on low tariffs (say, lower than 3 percent) in order 
to get a sense of the extent to which trade barriers matter and to understand the rationale for 
such a wasteful allocation of resources (collecting low tariffs often does not even cover the 
administrative costs of customs).  Indicator 6 could be improved with information on the 
management of tariff quotas—in particular, whether they are granted on a first come, first 
served rule or on another rule (underscored by OECD [2001], a first come, first served rule 
tends to have a protectionist impact).   
The simplicity index in industry relies on five basic indicators.  The first four are similar to 
the first four indicators for agriculture.  The fifth indicator consists of the frequency of nontariff 
measures. A high frequency would require greater efforts to investigate the exact impact of 
these nontariff measures in the export market. 
The first four indicators for industry could be improved in ways similar to those for 
agriculture. Indicator 5 would be improved with data on the number of customs officers (or 
enforcement officers in other government departments involved in NTM management) per dollar 
of imports, in order to capture the intensity with which nontariff measures could play an effective 
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role as a trade barrier on imports.  However, there is no systematic information available in this 
area. 
For each country, each basic indicator receives a score from 1 to 10, which reflects the 
decile to which the country belongs for that indicator.  For instance, the highest grade (10) is 
given to those farm trade policies pertaining to the decile with (1) the smallest number of tariff 
lines, (2) the lowest percentage of non-ad valorem bound tariffs, (3) the lowest standard 
deviation of bound tariffs, (4) the lowest percentage of non-duty-free tariffs, (5) the smallest 
number of product groups affected by export subsidies, and (6) the smallest number of tariff 
quotas.  In manufacturing, the same scoring system is applied for the first four common 
indicators with agriculture, and the highest grade (10) is given to trade policies pertaining to the 
decile with the lowest frequency of nontariff measures for indicator 5. 
Then, for each country, aggregated indices for agriculture and industry are calculated as 
simple averages of the corresponding basic indicators. This (admittedly crude) method provides 
indices for the 39 countries and six regions (North America, Latin America, Europe, Pacific Asia, 
Southeast Asia, and Africa).  The simplest trade policy would receive an index of 10 (it should 
be stressed that an index of 10 does not mean that the trade policy is perfectly simple, but 
merely that it is among the simplest available in the reference sample of 39 countries), and the 
most complicated an index of 1.  As simplicity indices of 10 and 1 do not necessarily exist 
(because they are the simple average of several basic indicators), the average simplicity index 




Table 9-5 shows that the seven Latin American countries for which there is information (there is 
no information available for Chile, Jamaica, and Peru) enjoy a simpler trade policy in agriculture 
than the reference average for the 39 countries.6  Only Colombia exhibits a trade policy less 
simple than the reference set. The European countries (Norway and the European Union) have 
the poorest performance in simplicity in farm matters, reflecting the many instruments included 
in their agricultural policies. Interestingly, table 9-5 shows no result by country that would be at 
odds with the general perception from the past 20 years of analyses and negotiations in the 
farm sector. 
                                                     
6 Table 9-5 gives summary results by aggregated index.  Detailed results by indicator are available from 
the authors. 
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Table 9-5 shows that the situation in industry is dramatically different. Latin American 
countries have a markedly more complicated trade policy than the reference average for the 
whole sample of countries. In particular, the three largest Latin American countries (Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico) have the most complicated trade policies of all the countries in the sample 
(with Turkey, but the observations for this country date from 1997, that is, at the time when the 
customs union signed with the European Union had not yet simplified Turkey’s trade policy).  
Three small Latin American countries (Jamaica, Costa Rica, and Chile) have an index higher 
than the average index of the reference sample of countries. 
The sharp contrast between the situation of Latin American countries in farm and 
industry matters is striking, all the more so because of the negligible difference between the 
world simplicity indices in agriculture and industry.  This implies a converse shift in other 
countries.  Of course, European countries provide the best illustration of this converse situation, 
although their relative performance in simplicity of industry is mediocre (close to the world 
average). 
Of course, simplicity is not synonymous with openness. Certain countries have a simple 
trade policy because they are open, as best illustrated by Iceland in industry, or Hong Kong, 
China in agriculture and industry. But simplicity does not necessarily imply openness. For 
instance, the European Union trade policy in industry is relatively open but complicated; trade 
policies of African countries tend to be relatively simple but not open; and India and (to a lesser 
extent) Sri Lanka exhibit relatively complex, closed trade policies. 
This observation raises two key issues for improving trade policies.  The first is the need 
to pay attention to the divergence between the measures of simplicity and openness—in 
particular, complex but open trade policies—since the lack of simplicity is likely to erode the 
benefits from open market access.  Second, detailed information based on the basic indicators 
shows the main sources of the lack of competitiveness in Latin American trade policies vis-à-vis 
the policies of the rest of the world:  the number of tariff lines in certain Latin American tariff 






Building the Indices 
The irreversibility indices aim at capturing the risks that an existing trade policy could be 
reversed rapidly and substantially.  Irreversibility is a major dimension of trade policy envisaged 
by producers, traders, and investors—and by GATT/WTO with the concept of bindings. 
The irreversibility index in agriculture relies on four indicators.  Greater irreversibility in 
trade policy implies the following:  
 
1. A smaller share of unbound tariffs in the tariff schedule. Unbound tariffs exempt the 
country from the most stringent WTO discipline, that is, the need to renegotiate any 
increase in a tariff above the binding ceiling rate.   
2. A smaller standard deviation in the fill rates of tariff quotas. A wide dispersion reflects 
the impact of quota management methods, assuming that the tariff quotas included in 
the UAA (3 to 5 percent of domestic consumption) are so small that they should be 
fulfilled at a similar (presumably high) rate.   
3. A smaller average use of export subsidy outlays.  
4. A smaller percentage of tariff lines potentially subjected to special agricultural 
safeguard provisions.   
 
The list misses the most relevant information on domestic farm policies, for instance, the 
existence of (legal or de facto) trade monopolies or farm boards, the risks of reversibility 
associated with sanitary and phytosanitary standards, labeling procedures, and nontrade 
concerns. For example, environmental policies may be perverse if, as is the case in the 
European Union, they may favor farmers who have been the initial polluters. 
In industry, the index relies on five indicators:   
 
1. A smaller share of unbound tariffs in the tariff schedule (as in agriculture) 
2. A smaller number of tariff lines with bound tariffs higher than 15 percent (because 
high unbound tariffs generate either higher risks of reversal or risks of larger reversals)   
3. A smaller difference between the bound and applied tariffs   
4. A smaller frequency of core nontariff barriers (NTBs) 
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5. A smaller number of anti-dumping cases (per hundred million dollars of imports) 
initiated during the period 1995-99. 
 
The economic rationale of all these indicators is obvious, although there are some apparent 
data problems.7 As for simplicity, the list of indicators could have been more complete.  For 
instance, a country that has no anti-dumping regulations is treated the same as one that has the 
regulation but has initiated anti-dumping cases, although the potential risk of irreversibility may 
be quite different, at least in the short run.  As a result, it would have been useful to add to 





The results in table 9-5 appear plausible, although the picture in manufacturing for Central 
European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) and Gabon seems too 
optimistic. (This may be due to the fact that, for these countries, the frequency of their core 
NTBs has been arbitrarily set to the regional average; see footnote 7.) 
Irreversibility indices provide the same global results as the simplicity indices, although 
they are slightly less marked:  the Latin American countries exhibit a noticeably higher level of 
irreversibility than the reference sample of countries in agriculture (European countries have the 
lowest level), whereas the converse situation prevails in industry.  Chile is the only exception in 
industry, with an index higher than the world average.  The contrast between large and small 
Latin American countries that was visible for simplicity does not hold clearly for irreversibility. 
Detailed results by basic indicator (not shown) suggest that trade policies can lack 
irreversibility for different reasons.  Three basic indicators explain the less-than-average indices 
of Latin American countries:  the large number of tariff lines with bound tariffs higher than 15 
percent (more than 99 percent of the Latin American tariff lines are in this situation, with the 
                                                     
7 For example, in some instances, applied tariffs are higher than bound tariffs for certain countries 
(indicator 3). This may result because observations on bound and applied tariffs are for different years or 
because of trade-weighted averaging.  Moreover, differences between bound and applied tariffs should 
ideally be assessed differently whether they are calculated over a small share of unbound tariffs or over a 
large share. A score of 1 has been attributed to all countries with a share of unbound tariffs larger than 50 
percent (independent of the observed difference between bound and applied tariffs for the country in 
question). Indicator 4 (frequency of core nontariff barriers) is not available for all countries. The European 
Union frequency has been applied to Central European countries, and the regional average to the Latin 
American, Pacific Asian, and African countries for which a specific observation is missing. 
 
 15
exception of Brazil [97.4 percent]); the large difference between bound and applied tariffs (the 
record being held by Jamaica with 41.2 percent); and the intensive use of anti-dumping 
measures per hundred million dollars of imports (Argentina and Peru being 18 times more 





Building the Indices 
The level of protection is another key dimension examined by producers, traders, and investors 
when making their decisions, and we attempt to capture this with the openness index. The 
openness index in agriculture relies on nine indicators.  Greater openness in farm trade policy 
implies the following:  
 
1. A smaller average bound tariff as estimated by the OECD 
2. A smaller average bound tariff as estimated by the World Bank8   
3. A smaller average applied tariff 
4. A smaller share of tariffs lower than 15 percent   
5. A smaller share of tariffs lower than 100 percent   
6. A smaller escalation index (the ratio of the average tariff on semi-processed goods 
with respect to the average tariff on unprocessed products, as calculated by WTO 2001, 
in order to take into account the magnification of nominal protection introduced by the 
escalation process 
7. A lower producer support estimate mirroring production subsidies (from OECD) 
8. A lower final post-Uruguay Round budgetary outlay commitment on export subsidies 
9. A higher fill rate of the tariff quotas.9 
 
The openness index in industry relies on eight indicators.  Greater openness in manufacturing 
trade policy for a given country implies the following:  
 
1. A smaller average bound tariff 
                                                     
8Bound tariffs in agriculture often have a specific tariff component that is difficult to quantify in ad valorem 
terms; therefore, we rely on the two available estimates provided by the OECD and the World Bank. 
9There is so little information on the average applied tariffs in agriculture that, unfortunately, it has been 
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2. A smaller average applied tariff  
3. A smaller share of peak tariffs (higher than 15 percent) 
4. A smaller escalation ratio (the ratio of the average tariff on finished products with 
respect to the average tariff on raw materials, as calculated by WTO 2001  
5. A smaller standard deviation of the applied tariffs (because a narrow range of tariff 
rates minimizes the risk and magnitude of effective protection) 
6. A smaller frequency of core NTBs 
7. A smaller use of anti-dumping actions (per thousand dollars)  
8. An indication of whether the country has signed the information technology agreement 
(ITA), reflecting the country’s openness to technical progress, which is key for 
liberalizing services.   
 
Since several Latin American countries are aggressive users of anti-dumping actions, an 
additional interesting piece of information would have been the average anti-dumping duty, or 




Table 9-5 provides a summary by region. According to detailed results by basic indicator (not 
shown), Latin American countries have average openness performance (compared with the 
reference sample) in agriculture, but significantly lower than average in industry.  In industry, 
there is a clear division between small countries (Chile, Costa Rica, and El Salvador) that are 
more open than the sample average, and large countries (Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina) that 





The approach described here is not only useful to better assess the existing situation.  It 
also provides useful lessons for improving existing trade policy by helping each country to 
assess the major weaknesses of its current policy. Thus, each country decides which remedy is 
most urgent and whether to undertake action in a unilateral or multilateral framework.  For 
instance, should a country focus on the simplicity dimension of its trade policy, or should it also 
                                                                                                                                                                           
impossible to introduce this indicator. 
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deal with the irreversibility or openness aspects?  For each aspect, what is the precise source of 
problems, hence the priority instrument for improvement?  Such questions are often overlooked 
when adopting trade policy.  For instance, many difficulties in trade facilitation flow from the 
implementation of complex trade policy.  Solving the problem at its source (simplifying trade 
policy) is a more efficient action than creating a problem by adopting a complex trade policy, 
and then investing in ways to deal with the problems it creates (Maur and Messerlin 2001). 
The three indices are correlated to a certain extent, but differently in agriculture and 
industry.10  The trade policies of most Latin American countries lag behind those of the rest of 
the sample—Chile being the main exception, with, in several instances, certain small Latin 
American countries (El Salvador and Jamaica). The fact that the Latin American country 
positions are better in agriculture than in industry reflects two converging forces:  the more 
protectionist approach of Latin American trading partners in agriculture, coupled with the Latin 
American comparative advantages in this activity, which induce these countries to have a more 
liberal trade policy. Of course, this situation is not satisfactory for Latin American consumers 
(who would benefit from less protection in industry) and producers (who would benefit from less 
protection in Latin American trading partners). 
This approach is useful from a policy perspective because it provides insight on the 
areas where improvements in policy should be made and on the environment in which such 
improvements should be made. This second point deserves more attention than usually 
granted. Openness is an issue that is best dealt with through WTO negotiations because a 
country can then compound the benefits from its lowered protection by the gains from lowered 
protection among its trading partners. By contrast, simplicity is a feature that could be 
addressed through unilateral actions because it permits a full return from the level of openness 
granted by previous trade negotiations. It seems counterproductive to erode granted trade 
concessions and their potential benefits by implementing a complicated trade policy, the 
ultimate consequence of which is to restrict market access.  In such a case, the country bears 
the political costs of liberalization, without realizing the economic gains.  Irreversibility may be a 
feature that needs multilateral disciplines, but it also has a purely domestic component in terms 
of subsidies and broadly conceived national treatment.   
In sum, decomposing trade policy into features that have different (unilateral or 
multilateral) tones suggests a subtle approach to trade liberalization.  For instance, simplifying 
                                                     
10 The lower level of quality for agricultural data compared with data on industry does not allow the 
combination of indices for agriculture and industry. This is even truer for services, where data are so poor 
that it has been impossible to conduct a similar exercise of scoring and calculating indices by country and 
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its trade policy would be unlikely to provide large benefits to Chile, which already ranks high in 
this domain.  By contrast, simplification would be productive for Argentina and Mexico; for 
instance, Mexico should reduce the number of tariff lines, and Argentina should reduce nontariff 
measures. Adding services would reinforce this contradiction, to the extent that privatization of 
services undertaken in Latin American countries is equivalent to liberalizing these services, an 
assumption that many economists and observers would challenge.  In effect, too many of these 
privatizations have consisted of moving public monopolies into private hands without a 
substantial opening of the markets involved. 
 
 
Trade Policies and Other Economic Policies 
 
Latin America has had a long history of populist policies, leading to overly expansive 
macroeconomic policies relying on deficit financing, generalized controls, and a disregard for 
basic economic equilibria (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991).  Policymakers, rejecting monetarist 
orthodoxy and influenced by structuralist supply-side solutions, thought that idle capacity would 
provide leeway for the economic expansion needed to improve living standards without running 
inflationary risks.  This was done by deficit financing, covered by foreign borrowing. When 
bottlenecks arose, usually from a lack of foreign exchange, devaluation was initially rejected 
because of the likely adverse consequences for inflation and living standards.  It was also 
argued that devaluation would not work because of institutional rigidities. For example, under 
existing systems of land tenure, it is easy to avoid increasing agricultural production in response 
to price incentives (increasing output would have required the possibility of creating larger 
farms). If agricultural production were increasing, the gains would be offset by a decline in the 
terms of trade. Moreover, in the absence of equivalent domestically produced goods, imports 
would not fall. Thus, it was argued that devaluation would not improve the trade balance, but 
rather lower real incomes and accelerate inflation. Nevertheless, each time the economic 
situation deteriorated, governments were usually forced to resort to price realignments, 
devaluation, exchange controls, and import restrictions. 
In Latin America, more than most other developing regions, fixed or managed exchange 
rate policies have often been used as a nominal anchor to help combat inflation. The risk 
attached to such policies is that, when real exchange rates appreciate, there is a negative effect 
on export competitiveness and export performance, affecting the overall balance-of-payments 
                                                                                                                                                                           
region. 
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position.  This occurred in Mexico until the tequila crisis of 1994, in Brazil up to 1998, and most 
recently in Argentina. Thus, Latin American countries (and the selected European countries) 
have persistently run current account deficits (table 9-6).  Although Pacific Asian countries faced 
a similar problem until the 1990s, they have had greater success in controlling deficits than has 
Latin America.  
In order to combat the deterioration in trade performance and balance of payments as a 
result of real exchange rate appreciation, countries in Latin America often used import 
restrictions in the past. However, with the tightening of WTO disciplines and Latin American 
countries’ increased participation in regional trade agreements, the option of using trade policy 
for balance-of-payments reasons has become more difficult. In any case, trade measures do 
nothing to address the domestic deficits that underlie current account imbalances, and likely 
inhibit the type of structural change necessary to resolve such problems. Therefore, in the past 
10-15 years, governments have increasingly addressed such macroeconomic problems with 
fiscal and monetary measures. 
Several economic indicators explain the nature of the problem. For example, Latin 
American (and European) countries have taken a less strict fiscal stance than the selected 
Pacific Asian countries, which have more often run fiscal surpluses.  Within Latin America, only 
Chile and the Dominican Republic have run surpluses since 1990.  In Latin America, fiscal 
deficits have been financed both by overseas borrowing and by printing money, giving rise to 
periods of high inflation and even hyperinflation.  The Central European countries have, at 
times, experienced similar problems, which are rare in the Pacific Asian countries that have 
generally had less than single-digit inflation since the mid 1980s.  In general, the Latin American 
countries had greater success in tackling inflation in the late 1990s, although it has persisted 
above 10 percent in Colombia and Mexico. 
Latin America’s need for foreign borrowing to finance development has been occasioned 
by the relatively poor rates of domestic savings and investment.  In the past 20 years, the 
GDS/GDP and GDI/GDP ratios in Latin America (and the selected European countries) have 
typically been 10-15 percentage points lower than those of Pacific Asia.11 For example, the 
GDS/GDP and GDI/GDP ratios were 21.3 and 19.9 percent, respectively, in Latin America in 
1997, and the corresponding figures for Pacific Asia were 33.7 and 37.1 percent, respectively.  
Developing and transition economies have also had a poor record in attracting FDI and indeed 
have often followed policies that explicitly rejected inward FDI flows. However, these policies 
                                                     
11 GDS is gross domestic savings and GDI is gross domestic investment. 
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changed in the 1990s, and recent data show that Latin America had some success in increasing 
foreign investment in the 1990s (table 9-7). 
Prior to the change in foreign investment policies, Latin America—and other developing 
regions—relied on sovereign borrowing from international financial institutions and foreign 
banks (although less so from banks since the debt crisis of the early 1980s). This has led to a 
huge debt servicing commitment. The debt service/gross national product ratios of Latin 
American countries are comparable to those of other regions, but, reflecting their poorer trade 
performance, Latin American ratios of total debt service to exports of goods and services have 
typically been around 15 percentage points higher than other regions, for example, 35 percent 
in 1998, compared with 21.7 percent for Pacific Asia and 18.1 percent for the European 
countries. 
Latin America’s performance resulted in lack of confidence in the region, which is also 
reflected in relatively high real interest rates, 10-18 percent in the 1990s, compared with 5-8 
percent for Pacific Asia.  If the private sector has to pay such high interest rates for borrowing 
for capital investments, this must also affect Latin America’s international competitiveness.  
Competitiveness is factored into export performance through relative prices that are a 
component of real exchange rates. 
Thus, macroeconomic policies impinge on trade performance through a number of 
channels. High inflation, as a result of lax fiscal and monetary disciplines, directly affects all 
prices in the domestic economy.  High interest rates, which result from uncertainty, and high 
foreign borrowing affect factor prices. And relative price movements are a component in the real 
exchange rate. In addition, using the nominal exchange rate as an anchor to control domestic 
inflation may result in a real appreciation with negative effects on export performance. If import 
restrictions or import taxes are used to tackle balance-of-payments deficits, they will also cause 





WTO commitments have helped to lock in autonomous reforms, and have contributed to 
the predictability and transparency of trade regimes (governance issues), although they have 
done little to further open Latin American markets.  Some advances have been made through 
regional trade agreements, despite important exclusions. The new WTO agenda and ongoing 
negotiations in RTAs may lead to further changes, but there is an impression that trade reforms 
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have stalled, and the evidence on simplicity, irreversibility, and openness provided above shows 
that there is considerable variation among countries. Much remains to be done on simplifying 
and opening up trade regimes and locking them in. Moreover, although the analysis has 
focused on trade policy, good governance requires actions on the entire legal framework of a 
country. Privatization programs tend to focus too little on effective competition, weak 
government procurement procedures, and the lack of a strong competition policy in all but a few 
countries. Therefore, markets are less contestable than is desirable, and this impacts the 
international competitiveness of domestic production.   
To understand the evolution of trade policy in Latin America, it is important to take 
macroeconomic policy into account.  The relatively high level of inflation in the region led some 
countries to adopt fixed exchange rates or managed floats, which, together with other policies, 
caused real exchange rate appreciation with negative effects on export competitiveness.  Latin 
America’s savings/investment ratios are low compared with those in Pacific Asia.  Past policies 
pushed up the cost of borrowing for domestic investment and made it difficult for Latin America 
to attract FDI, the key to improving productivity and competitiveness. 
Finally, while the majority of developing countries have much to do to complete their 
trade reform programs, they continue to face the problem of protectionism in major markets 
(Laird 1999; Messerlin 2001).  Apart from high, escalating tariffs on certain key exports of the 
developing countries, they have increasingly resorted to administrative protection—anti-
dumping policies and export restraint agreements. Developing countries face nontariff barriers 
to their exports of chemicals, iron and steel, other basic manufactures, textiles and clothing, and 
electronic goods. In addition, quotas, surcharges, variable levies, subsidies, and state trading 
have distorted agricultural trade.  This result partly reflects the absence of developing countries 
in the GATT rounds. Hence, it is important for these countries to participate actively in the post-
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Source: Data from WDI 2000 (CD-ROM).
 
 
Note: Countries in the sample are listed in table 9-1.  
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Table 9-1. Real Growth in GDP in Selected Countries, 1965-98 
(Percent) 
Country/region 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-97 1997-98 
Argentina 4.0 3.1 2.8 -2.5 -0.5 6.6 6.8 3.9
Brazil 7.8 10.3 6.7 1.1 2.0 3.1 3.0 0.1
Chile 4.6 -1.4 7.3 0.9 6.7 8.7 7.5 3.4
Colombia 5.9 5.7 5.4 2.2 4.5 4.5 2.4 0.6
Dominican Republic 9.0 9.0 4.9 2.3 2.8 4.2 7.7 7.3
Mexico 6.2 6.3 7.1 1.9 1.7 1.5 6.0 4.8
Latin America 
(average) 
6.2 5.5 5.7 1.0 2.9 4.8 5.6 3.4
   
Korea, Republic of 10.5 8.1 7.1 8.1 10.0 7.5 5.9 -5.8
Singapore 12.9 9.5 8.5 6.2 8.4 9.1 7.8 1.5
Thailand 9.1 5.7 8.0 5.4 10.3 8.6 2.1 -9.4
Indonesia 6.3 7.8 7.9 5.6 7.1 7.8 6.3 -13.2
Asia (average) 10.9 7.8 7.8 6.6 9.6 8.4 5.2 -4.6
   
Poland - - - 0.1 1.1 2.7 6.4 4.8
Romania - - 7.4 3.1 -3.0 -2.1 -1.5 -7.5
Turkey - 5.7 2.8 4.9 5.6 3.2 7.2 2.8
Europe (average) - 5.7 5.1 2.7 1.2 1.3 4.1 0.0
Note: Values are based on GDP at market prices (1995 U.S. dollar prices). 
Source: World Development Indicators (2000, CD-ROM). 
 
 
Table 9- 2. Growth in Exports of Goods and Services, 1980-98  
(Percent based on current dollars) 
 
Country/region 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-97 1997-98 
Argentina 0.3 8.1 11.1 11.2 0.5 
Brazil 4.9 4.9 8.4 6.0 -0.7 
Chile -5.5 17.9 13.6 3.6 -8.8 
Colombia -3.3 14.0 7.2 7.6 -5.2 
Dominican Republic 0.8 6.7 25.6 11.0 6.0 




3.5 8.5 11.3 11.5 2.1 
 
Indonesia 8.6 12.6 9.3 -13.3 
Korea, Republic of 9.0 19.2 15.0 5.8 -5.0 
Singapore 2.8 19.3 17.0 2.7 -17.6 
Thailand 2.8 26.3 19.2 1.5 -9.0 
Asia (average) 5.3 20.3 16.6 3.7 -10.7 
 
Poland -4.1 7.8 13.4 5.5 9.2 
Romania -2.0 -10.2 8.1 2.9 -4.4 
Turkey 25.2 13.6 11.7 19.2 4.9 
Europe (average) 2.0 5.8 12.0 11.6 5.7 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2000 (CD-ROM).  
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Table 9-3. Factors Affecting Export Performance in the Sample Countries, 1981-98  
 
 
Variable Coefficient t-value 
Constant -90.15 4.08 
Real exchange rate  -0.46 3.45 
GDP growth in industrial countries 2.27 14.24 





Degrees of freedom 17  
 
Note: Values are from ordinary least squares regression; the dependent variable is the export index.  
The countries in the sample are listed in table 9-1. 





































Table 9-4. Gross Tariff Liberalization Elasticities for Selected Countries, 1980s and 1990s 
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Argentina 30.0 1989 12.2 1992 -0.359 -0.172 -0.152 -0.245 -0.262 -0.261
Brazil 51.0 1988 12.5 1996 -0.117 -0.434 -0.371 0.319 -0.127 -0.125
Chile 20.0 1985 11.0 1992 -0.902 -3.313 -3.640 -0.673 -2.140 -2.461
Colombia 31.0 1987 11.5 1996 -0.329 -1.853 -1.989 0.172 -1.447 -1.642
Mexico 22.6 1986 12.5 1993 0.047 -0.525 -0.634 0.382 -0.653 -0.757
Indonesia 27.0 1985 20.0 1994 -0.642 -3.437 -3.680 0.694
Korea 24.0 1984 9.0 1995 -0.114 -1.338 -1.426 0.343 -0.481 -0.551
Thailand 44.0 1991 23.1 1995 -0.341 -1.777 -1.680 0.112 -1.090 -0.985







Note: Values for elasticities are simple averages for all products, including agriculture, except for Poland (which is a trade-weighted average).   
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 9-5. Aggregate Indexes for Agriculture and Industry, Selected Countries and Regions  
Agriculture Industry Countries 
Regions Regions Simplicity Irreversibility Openness Simplicity Irreversibility Openness
Canada NA 7.8 9.0 9.3 8.2 8.6 9.8
United States NA 6.7 7.0 9.1 7.4 7.5 9.4
Argentina LAC 7.0 10.0 6.8 5.0 7.2 6.4
Brazil LAC 7.0 10.0 8.0 5.2 7.6 6.9
Chile LAC 7.2 7.2 8.4
Colombia LAC 6.8 8.3 5.6 6.4 6.8 7.5
Costa Rica LAC 8.5 8.5 7.4 8.1 8.4
El Salvador LAC 10.0 9.0 6.8 8.6 8.5
Jamaica LAC 8.0 8.0 7.0
Mexico LAC 7.8 8.0 7.9 5.2 7.2 6.9
Peru LAC 6.8 6.8 6.9
Venezuela LAC 7.0 7.5 6.3 6.6 6.8 7.1
European Union E 4.8 6.8 7.0 6.6 6.3 9.6
Iceland E 6.5 8.0 6.7 8.8 7.5 9.1
Norway E 3.5 5.8 5.0 8.8 5.8 8.4
Switzerland E 5.7 5.5 7.4 5.8 6.1 10.0
Turkey E 3.8 5.5 6.3 4.6 5.0 7.8
Czech Republic E 6.8 8.5 8.7 7.2 7.8 9.3
Hungary E 5.2 3.5 8.6 6.0 5.8 7.6
Poland E 4.8 5.0 7.1 6.4 5.8 8.9
Romania E 4.8 7.5 3.5 6.2 5.5 7.5
Australia PA 9.2 9.8 8.9 7.2 8.7 9.1
Hong Kong PA 8.4 8.4 10.0
Indonesia PA 7.8 10.0 7.4 6.6 8.0 8.3
Japan PA 8.6 9.7 7.7 8.8 8.7 9.6
Korea PA 6.2 8.0 6.0 8.0 7.1 9.1
Malaysia PA 8.0 7.3 8.2 6.6 7.5 7.8
New Zealand PA 9.8 8.8 8.1 7.6 8.6 9.3
Philippines PA 7.8 8.3 6.7 7.6 7.6 8.7
Singapore PA 10.0 8.2 9.1 10.0
Thailand PA 6.8 9.0 6.5 6.4 7.2 7.8
India SEA 7.0 8.0 3.0 5.8 6.0 4.0
Sri Lanka SEA 7.0 10.0 6.8 6.4 7.6 7.9
Cameroon A 7.8 7.8 7.3
Chad A 7.8 7.8 7.3
Gabon A 8.0 8.0 7.4
South Africa A 6.3 6.3 8.5 7.0 7.0 7.0
Tunisia A 7.3 7.0 3.4 6.2 6.0 5.9
Zimbabwe A 7.0 7.0 6.7
 





Minimum index  3.5 3.5 3.0 4.6 5.0 4.0
Maximum index  10.0 10.0 10.0 8.8 9.1 10.0
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Agriculture Industry Countries 




NA 7.3 8.0 9.2
 
7.8 8.1 9.6
Latin America LAC 7.7 8.8 6.9 6.5 7.4 7.4
Europe E 5.1 6.2 6.7 6.7 6.2 8.7
Pacific Asia PA 8.2 8.9 7.4 7.5 8.1 9.0
Southeast Asia SEA 7.0 9.0 4.9 6.1 6.8 5.9







All countries except 
Latin America 
 6.8 7.6 7.0 7.2 7.2 8.3
Industrial countries  7.2 7.8 7.5 7.8 7.7 9.4
Developing countries  6.9 7.9 6.6 6.6 7.1 7.4
 
 




Table 9-6. Current Account Balance, Selected Countries and Regions, 1980-1998  
(Percentage of GDP) 
 
Country/region 1980 1985 1990 1995 1997 1998
Argentina -6.2 -1.1 3.2 -1.9 -4.1 -4.9
Brazil -5.5 -0.1 -0.8 -2.6 -3.7 -4.3
Chile -7.1 -8.6 -1.6 -2.3 -5.0 -5.3
Colombia -0.5 -4.5 1.2 -5.0 -5.4 -5.7
Dominican 
Republic 
-10.9 -2.1 -4.0 -1.5 -1.1 -2.1




-5.8 -2.7 -0.8 -2.3 -3.6 -4.4
Indonesia  -2.2 -2.6 -3.2 -2.3 4.2
Korea, Republic 
of 
-8.5 -0.8 -0.8 -1.7 -1.7 12.6
Singapore -13.3 0.0 8.5 17.3 15.8 20.9
Thailand -6.4 -4.0 -8.5 -8.1 -2.0 12.8
Asia (average) -9.4 -1.8 -0.9 1.1 2.4 12.6
Poland -6.0 -1.4 5.0 0.7 -4.0 -4.4
Romania  -8.5 -5.4 -6.1 -7.6
Turkey -5.0 -1.5 -1.7 -1.4 -1.4 0.9
Europe (average) -5.5 -1.5 -1.7 -2.0 -3.8 -3.7





Table 9-7. Foreign Direct Investment, 1980-88 
(Percentage of GDP and millions of dollars) 
 
  
Country/region 1980 1990 1997 1998 
 








Brazil 0.8 0.2 2.4 4.1 
Chile 0.8 1.9 7.0 5.9 
Colombia 0.4 1.1 5.2 3.0 
Dominican Republic 1.4 1.9 2.8 4.4 
México 1.0 1.0 3.6 2.6 
Latin America 
(average) 
0.9 1.2 4.0 3.7 
 
 
Indonesia 0.2 1.0 2.2 -0.4 
Korea, Republic of 0.0 0.3 0.6 1.7 
Singapore 10.5 15.2 10.2 8.6 
Thailand 0.6 2.9 2.5 6.2 
Asia (average) 2.8 4.8 3.9 4.0 
 
Romania .. 0.0 3.5 5.3 
Turkey 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.5 
Poland .. 0.1 3.4 4.0 
Europe (average)  0.0 0.2 2.4 3.3 
 
Millions of dollars    
Argentina 788 1,836 4,924 4,177 
Brazil 1,544 324 18,608 29,192 
Chile 213 654 3,354 1,840 
Colombia 51 484 4,894 2,509 
México 2,090 2,634 .. .. 
Dominican Republic 93 133 .. .. 
Latin America (total) 4,779 6,064 31,780 37,718 
 
Indonesia .. 1,093 4,499 -400 
Korea, Republic of -20 -264 -1,605 616 
Singapore 1,138 3,541 4,988 4,110 
Thailand 187 2,303 3,356 6,811 
Asia (total) 6,176 6,674 11,238 11,137 
 
Romania 0 -18 1,224 2,040 
Turkey 18 700 554 573 
Poland .. 89 4,908 6,365 
Europe (total) 18 771 6,686 8,978 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2000 (CD-ROM). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33
